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I. INTRODUCTION 
“I’ll take three of those,” said Brandon, as he pointed to the newest TracFones 
behind the register. The phones contained a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) 
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device which, among other features, allows its user to access turn-by-turn directions. 
The cashier took three phones off of the rusty rack and activated each one. Brandon 
traveled forty-four miles south to a gas station where he bought three more 
TracFones. He then travelled nearly thirty miles west to a corner store where he 
purchased even more. In Brandon’s world, these phones are known as burners—
phones typically used in the drug trade. Brandon purchased the burners for Mr. 
Russell, Cleveland’s biggest drug dealer, who then distributed the burners 
throughout his criminal enterprise. 
Law enforcement followed Russell’s operations, but was unable to obtain 
sufficient information to bring a case against him. The Cleveland Police Department 
(“Department”) obtained warrants to intercept calls made on the burners, but the 
wire taps only lasted for a matter of hours because the phones were disposed of after 
their pre-paid minutes were used up. Russell’s paranoia, loading the burners with 
minimal minutes in order to avoid wire taps, caused the Department to waste 
manpower, time, and money—the cost of the intercepted calls totaled nearly seven 
hundred dollars per call.  
Although it appeared impossible to tap calls made by or to Russell, the 
Department obtained a device that collected cell phone information from nearby cell 
phone towers. The Department could now “ping” data from cell phone towers near 
Russell’s loft and business. Officers worked day and night to monitor Russell’s 
smartphone and to track his movements using the GPS chip embedded in his phone. 
For reasons then unknown, Russell left Cleveland and headed south towards 
Kentucky. With the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the officers 
were able to track Russell as he moved from Cleveland to Louisville. After losing 
sight of Russell on Interstate 71, the Department’s major crime unit and a handful of 
FBI agents were able to locate Russell in an abandoned warehouse using the GPS in 
his smartphone. Russell was arrested for possession of narcotics with intent to 
distribute. 
Months later, Russell’s attorney, Maurice Banks, filed a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained at the scene of the crime, arguing that the evidence was obtained 
unlawfully. Mr. Banks argued that the Department and the FBI should have obtained 
a warrant before they began tracking Russell’s smartphone.1  
Is Mr. Banks correct? Should a warrant be required when law enforcement 
utilizes the GPS technology in a user’s smartphone to locate or track the user? Most 
courts have answered in the affirmative.2 When such questions are before the courts, 
they consider whether the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) or the 
Fourth Amendment applies.3 A recent Sixth Circuit decision, United States v. 
                                                                                                                                            
 1 The opening narrative was based off of season three of The Wire. The Wire: The Third 
Season (HBO 2004). 
 2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, *7-9 (Mass. Supp. 2012) 
(finding that a warrant is required before cell site location information (CSLI) is used); see 
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (finding that evidence obtained by a 
warrantless use of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that monitoring a pager in a private residence without obtaining a 
warrant violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
 3 For courts applying the Stored Communications Act (SCA), see United States v. Navas, 
640 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying a combination of the SCA and the Pen 
Register Act); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and 
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
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Skinner, applied the Fourth Amendment because the court focused on whether the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in inherent location data 
broadcasted from the defendant’s cell phone.4 The court held that no warrant was 
required when tracking an individual’s cell phone5 because the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data emitted from his cell phone.6 However, 
should the ECPA have been implicated as well? 
This Note argues that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, rather than under 
the ECPA or no warrant at all, must be obtained prior to collection of GPS data7 
from a user’s smartphone, whether payment for the phone is contractual or pay-as-
you-go.8 Part II of this Note discusses smartphones and how the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment applies to smartphone tracking. That Section also discusses the 
legislative intent behind the ECPA and its inapplicability to smartphone tracking. In 
addition, Part II addresses United States Supreme Court decisions regarding 
electronic monitoring by law enforcement, as well as the development and present 
use of GPS technology. 
Part III discusses the different approaches that twenty-first century courts have 
taken when deciding which authority, the ECPA or Fourth Amendment, allows law 
enforcement to collect GPS data from individuals’ smartphones. Part IV explains 
why the ECPA is not the proper standard for collection of GPS data. That Section 
also explains why a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained prior to 
collection of GPS data using case law and public policy arguments to support this 
position. In addition, Part IV addresses and rebuts any Fourth Amendment 
arguments against requiring a warrant prior to collection of GPS data. Lastly, Part IV 
presents solutions to curb the growing problem of warrantless smartphone GPS data 
collection. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE TRACKING OF INDIVIDUALS’ SMARTPHONES USING GPS 
TECHNOLOGY 
Law enforcement’s use of GPS technology to track individuals’ smartphones 
under the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause has been a concern in 
recent cases.9 This Section briefly discusses smartphones.10 This Section also 
                                                                                                                                            
Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006) (applying a combination of 
the SCA and the Pen Register Act). For courts applying the Fourth Amendment, see 
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 (Mass. Supp. 2012) (applying the reasonable 
expectation standard); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying the 
reasonable expectation standard). 
 4 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777-79. 
 5 Id. at 781. 
 6 Id. 
 7 GPS data is the general term that will be used throughout this Note for collection of 
CSLI or ping data, in addition to any other GPS data. 
 8 The term pay-as-you-go will be used synonymously with burner. 
 9 This was a concern of Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 10 Smartphones are mobile phones that offer more advanced computing ability and 
connectivity than a contemporary, basic phone. See Andrew Nusca, Smartphone v. Feature 
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discusses the Fourth Amendment and its applicability to smartphone tracking. The 
legislative intent behind the ECPA will then be discussed. Lastly, this Section 
discusses United States Supreme Court decisions relating to electronic surveillance, 
as well as advancements in GPS technology. 
A. Smartphones: Cell Phones with an Education 
Smartphones have become the industry standard within the past decade. 
Smartphones are cell phones that also have the capabilities of personal digital 
assistants, such as email and Internet.11 Since smartphones were first introduced in 
2001, their number of users has continually increased, with over 100 million 
smartphone users in the United States in 2012.12 This number will likely grow in the 
coming years, making the issue of warrantless collection of smartphone GPS data a 
growing problem. 
Smartphones can be either contractual or non-contractual.13 There may be issues 
if a court decides to distinguish between the two types;14 this distinction, however, is 
unnecessary. Non-contractual smartphones are also known as burners, prepaid cell 
phones, TracFones, and pay-as-you-go phones.15 Burners are no different than 
contractual smartphones, except the user owns the smartphone with no contract, 
credit check, or activation and cancellation fees.16 Furthermore, there is an iPhone 
app that allows smartphone users to create temporary phone numbers and dispose of 
                                                                                                                                            
Phone Arms Race Heats Up; Which Did You Buy?, ZDNET (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www. 
zdnet.com/blog/gadgetreviews/smartphone-vs-feature-phone-arms-race-heats-up-which-did-
you-buy/6836. A smartphone has built-in applications and Internet access. In addition to 
digital voice service, modern smartphones provide text messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still 
and video cameras, an MP3 player, video playback, and calling. ENCYLOPEDIA, PC MAG, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013); see also TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/smartphone 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2013); Smartphone Definition, MERIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/smartphone (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). In addition, 
smartphones act as media players, digital cameras, video cameras, a GPS navigation device, a 
mini laptop, and game console. For more information on smartphones, see Part II.E of this 
Note. 
 11 See Smartphone Definition, MERIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/smartphone (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 12 Sascha Segan, Kyocera Launches First Smartphone in Years, PC MAG (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2361664,00.asp; Trevor Mogg, US Smartphone Users 
Now Over 100 Million, Android Increases Market Share (Mar. 6, 2012), http://news.yahoo. 
com/us-smartphone-users-now-over-100-million-android-041611789.html. 
 13 Contractual smartphones are smartphones where the service provider requires the user 
to obtain a contract for a specific amount of time. 
 14 Issues arise due to the fact that criminals such as Mr. Russell prefer non-contractual 
phones. This may distort a court’s view of the defendant. See United States v. Skinner, 690 
F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between contractual and non-contractual 
smartphones). 
 15 Overview, TRACFONE, http://www.tracfone.com/facelift/tour.jsp#a_overview (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 16 Id. 
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them, allowing contractual smartphones to in effect perform exactly like their non-
contractual counterparts.17 This eliminates any distinction between the two types of 
smartphones in that contractual smartphone users, in essence, can convert their 
smartphone into a burner. 
B. Two Peas in a Pod: The Fourth Amendment and Smartphone Tracking 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of United States citizens “to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”18 The Fourth Amendment also states the grounds on which the 
government can perform searches and seizures: The government must obtain a 
warrant issued on “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”19 Because the Fourth Amendment does not actually mention smartphones or 
GPS tracking, an inquiry into the Founders’ reasons for enacting the Fourth 
Amendment is beneficial to understanding the relation between the Fourth 
Amendment and smartphones.  
The Framers of the Amendment were influenced by government action in 
England and the American colonies that violated personal liberties. In two English 
cases, Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, the government seized property 
using general warrants—warrants with no names or places to be searched.20 The 
general warrants were struck down and judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiffs in both cases.21 In the Massachusetts Writs of Assistance case, the 
government searched any place where the sought after property could be hidden 
without any suspicion the goods were actually there.22 Unlike in Entick and Wilkes, 
the search was ruled legal and judgment was entered in favor of the government.23 
The use of general warrants in these cases prompted the drafting of the Fourth 
Amendment.24 
The reasons why the Framers drafted the Amendment are relevant to the analysis 
at issue, despite the fact that smartphones and GPS neither influenced the Fourth 
                                                                                                                                            
 17 Damien Scott, Burner iPhone App Lets You Create Temporary Phone Numbers, 
COMPLEX (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.complex.com/tech/2012/08/burner-iphone-app-lets-
you-create-temporary-phone-numbers; see also Chris Maxcer, Burner Is a Handy Way to 
Grab a Throwaway Phone Number, TECHNEWSWORLD (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www. 
macnewsworld.com/story/75878.html (explaining the iPhone burner app); Stephanie Mlot, 
Create Disposable Phone Numbers with Burner iPhone App, PC MAG (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2408265,00.asp (explaining the burner app). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. 
Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763). 
 21 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. 
Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763). 
 22 Writs of Assistance Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761). 
 23 Id. 
 24 GERARD V. BRADLEY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 323-24 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005). 
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Amendment’s drafting nor were contemplated by the Framers. Such is the case 
because not requiring a warrant based on probable cause permits the government, as 
the above cases forbid, to collect GPS data without describing the location of the 
person they intend to track.25 Not requiring a warrant or probable cause for the 
search also allows the government to track a person without describing any 
connection with the smartphone or the crime investigated.26 This resembles the 
government’s use of general warrants during colonial America. The precise reason 
the Amendment was adopted was to curb the use of general warrants, not permit 
them to occur hundreds of years later.27 In addition, Supreme Court decisions help 
make sense of the connection between the Fourth Amendment and smartphone 
tracking. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence gives guidance on many of the terms that the 
Fourth Amendment contains. For example, a search requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause occurs in two circumstances. First, when law enforcement trespasses 
on a searched person’s property, also known as a physical intrusion.28 Second, when 
a searched person’s expectation of privacy in the thing searched is reasonable and 
society believes that the expectation of privacy is reasonable.29 The Court has also 
defined seizure and probable cause.30 In addition, the Court has crafted numerous 
exceptions to the warrant requirement including exigent circumstances, arrests 
outside the home, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, automobiles, and 
street stops and frisks.31 
When focusing on collection of GPS data, a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
the point of issue.32 Smartphone users have an expectation of privacy in their GPS 
data and society believes that the expectation of privacy is reasonable. Because the 
Fourth Amendment was meant to restrict the use of general warrants and because the 
Supreme Court has defined many terms in the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment and a warrant based on probable cause are proper when deciding 
smartphone GPS tracking cases. 
                                                                                                                                            
 25 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 778-79 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 26 Id. 
 27 BRADLEY, supra note 24, at 327. 
 28 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
 29 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; Katz, 389 U.S. 347.  
 30 A seizure has been defined as a “meaningful interference with an individual’s 
possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty. 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). Persons 
may also be seized, but this is not at issue here. Probable cause has been defined as “a fair 
probability.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983). 
 31 The exception that will most likely apply to collection of a smartphone user’s GPS 
information is exigent circumstances. “Courts recognize the existence of exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search in several situation, including: to prevent the 
destruction of evidence, to [ensure safety,] when police are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing 
suspect, or when other emergency circumstances exist, such as the need to assist injured 
individuals.” Patterson v. North Carolina, No. 5:12 cv-182-RJC, 2013 WL 170431, at *3 
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 16, 2013). The standard under exigent circumstances is a “reasonable 
suspicion”—a lower standard than probable cause. Id. 
 32 BRADLEY, supra note 24, at 323. 
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C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)33 sets the standard for how 
disclosure of electronic communications or records may take place without a warrant 
based on probable cause.34 Congress wanted to protect electronic communications 
from government intrusion by clearly defining and limiting government 
surveillance.35 Electronic communications are “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by 
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”36 This does not, however, include any wire or 
oral communication, any communication made through a tone-only paging device, 
any communication from a tracking device, or electronic funds transfer information 
stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic 
storage and transfer of funds.37 When the communication does not fall within the 
purview of the ECPA, courts will scrutinize the government’s intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment.38 
GPS-embedded smartphones are not covered by the ECPA for two reasons. First, 
using a GPS embedded smartphone as a tracking device explicitly falls outside of the 
electronic communications definition.39 As previously mentioned, electronic 
communications are not, among other things, tracking devices.40 Second, 
smartphones did not exist at the time the ECPA was enacted.41 Allowing the ECPA 
to govern smartphone tracking does not coincide with the reason that the Act was 
drafted—to keep pace with the technological advancements at that time.42 Congress 
                                                                                                                                            
 33 The ECPA is made up of three titles. Title I protects wire, oral, and electronic 
communications. Title II, also known as the Stored Communications Act, protects 
communications held in electronic storage. Title III prohibits the use of pen register and/or 
trap and trace devices to record dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information used in 
the process of transmitting wire or electronic communications without a court order. 
 34 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (West 2014). 
 35 H.R. REP. 103-827, at *17 (1994). 
 36 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (West 2014). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 
2013) (looking at whether the Fourth Amendment or ECPA applied); United States v. 
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (same); In re Application of the U.S. for an 
Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; 
and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 
682 (W.D. La. 2006) (same); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(same). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See H.R. REP. 103-827, at *17 (1994); S. REP. 99-541, at *2 (1986). See generally Orin 
S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
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stated that the continual “development of new methods of communication and 
devices for surveillance has [dramatically expanded] the opportunity for [arbitrary 
government] intrusions.”43 For this very reason, Congress enacted the ECPA. 
Congress also stated that one of its goals in enacting the ECPA was “to protect 
privacy interests in personal and proprietary information, while protecting the 
Government’s legitimate law enforcement needs.”44 While it is important to protect 
law enforcement’s needs, individuals’ privacy interests should not take a back seat to 
the needs of the government. Because smartphone technology is a new method of 
communication and has been used as a surveillance device, applying the ECPA to 
smartphone GPS tracking is contrary to its enactment. 
D. Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Jones: Setting the Table for GPS Smartphone Tracking 
Four United States Supreme Court cases have shaped the current law of GPS 
tracking in smartphones. Important to note is that the four cases all rely on the 
Fourth Amendment rather than the ECPA.45 The Supreme Court established the 
reasonable expectation standard in Katz v. United States.46 In Katz, the petitioner 
challenged the government’s attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public 
phone booth as a violation of his constitutional rights.47 The Court found that a 
conversation is protected from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment if it is made with a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”48 Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion launched the “Katz test,” consisting of a two-part 
inquiry.49 In order to determine whether a search violated a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, courts must consider: (1) Has the individual manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?; and (2) Is 
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?50 This test has been 
applied in numerous GPS tracking cases,51 as well as influenced United States v. 
Knotts, United States v. Karo, and the concurring opinions in United States v. Jones. 
The Supreme Court in Knotts52 set forth the proposition that individuals have no 
expectation of privacy on public roadways.53 In Knotts, federal agents placed a 
                                                                                                                                            
 43 S. REP. 99-541, at *2 (1986). 
 44 Id. at *3. 
 45 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
 46 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61. 
 47 Id. at 348. 
 48 Id. at 360. 
 49 Id. at 360-61. 
 50 Id. at 361. 
 51 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying the Fourth 
Amendment to cell phone GPS tracking); United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. 
Mich. 2013) (same); Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445 (Mass. App. Div. 2012) 
(same); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 (Mass. App. Div. 2012) (same); State 
v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013) (same). 
 52 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
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beeper into a container that was to be purchased by respondent.54 The agents were 
able to monitor the movement of the container as it moved along the highway and 
eventually to respondent’s home.55 The Court held that “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”56 The Court found no reasonable expectation 
of privacy because the information obtained had been voluntarily conveyed to the 
public by traveling on public roads.57 This rule has been applied incorrectly to the 
monitoring of individuals using the GPS emanating from the person’s smartphone.58 
In Karo, the Supreme Court considered whether the installation of a beeper in a 
container amounted to a search or seizure.59 Federal agents installed a beeper on a 
container in order to locate the movement of the container from location to 
location.60 The Court held that the installation, with the consent of the original 
owner, does not invade a buyer’s privacy when the buyer had no knowledge of the 
presence of the beeper.61 However, the Court found that monitoring a beeper in a 
private residence violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights because a warrant 
must be obtained in order to search a house.62 This requirement of a warrant has also 
been applied to situations where law enforcement tracks the GPS in an individual’s 
smartphone.63 
In Jones, which has been both relied on and distinguished by smartphone 
tracking cases,64 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether the attachment 
of a GPS device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of the device to 
track the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.”65 
The government attached the GPS device to the defendant’s vehicle without a proper 
                                                                                                                                            
 53 Id. at 280-81. 
 54 Id. at 277. 
 55 Id. at 278-79. 
 56 Id. at 281. 
 57 Id. at 281-82. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777-79 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying 
Knotts). Due to the holding in Jones and society’s current state, Knotts is no longer applicable 
to cases where law enforcement collects an individual’s smartphone GPS data. 
 59 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 60 Id. at 708. 
 61 Id. at 712. 
 62 Id. at 718. 
 63 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (applying 
Karo). 
 64 Cases relying on Jones include: Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445; Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 
30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 (Mass. App. Div. 2012); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013). Cases 
distinguishing Jones include: United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012); 
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777-79 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 65 Letter from N. Mark Rapoport, S.C. Senior Assistant Att’y Gen., to Brian Buck, Chief 
of Police, 2012 WL 1260180, at *1 (2012). 
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warrant and tracked the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days.66 Once indicted, 
the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS device.67 
The district court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was at the 
defendant’s residence;68 however, the court admitted into evidence the data obtained 
while the vehicle was on public streets, evoking Knotts.69 The Circuit Court for the 
District of Columbia reversed on appeal, holding that the admission of the evidence 
obtained by the warrantless use of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.70 
Affirming the decision of the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that the 
attachment of the GPS devise constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because of the government’s “physical intrusion on an ‘effect’ for the purpose of 
obtaining information . . . .”71 In reaching this decision, the Court utilized the 
“physical trespass test.”72 This holding appears to ignore Knotts by affirming the 
decision of the circuit court to overrule the district court’s holding that relied on 
Knotts to find that no search occurred on public thoroughfares.73 
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Katz test provides 
individuals more protection than the test applied by the majority.74 She noted that the 
government can circumvent the Jones holding by enlisting factory-installed or 
owner-installed tracking devices, i.e. GPS-enabled smartphones, instead of 
physically attaching a tracking device.75 Justice Sotomayor stated that the delicate 
information received by the GPS to determine “the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements” should be taken into 
account.76 This weakens the Knotts holding, implying that a person may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in GPS data collected on public roads. She also 
recognized the difficulty in determining what a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
in society’s present “digital age.”77 
Justice Alito’s concurrence expounded upon the points made by Justice 
Sotomayor. Justice Alito found that continuous monitoring of every single 
movement of an individual’s car for twenty-eight days violated individuals’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy and thus constituted a search.78 He explained that 
                                                                                                                                            
 66 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
 67 Id. at 953. 
 68 Id. at 953-55. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 950. 
 72 Id. at 949-50; see supra Part II.A. Although the majority applied the “physical trespass 
test,” the concurring opinions focused on the “Katz test.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54, 58. 
 73 Id. at 954. 
 74 Id. at 954. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 956. 
 77 Id. at 957. 
 78 Id. at 963-64. 
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prior to GPS devices, a month-long surveillance of an individual would have been 
demanding and costly—requiring a tremendous amount of resources and people.79 
As a result, society’s expectations that such surveillance would not happen to them 
are reasonable.80 
These four cases lay the groundwork for searches involving smartphones. Some 
courts, however, distinguish Jones and apply Knotts, which held that a person 
traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements.81 Courts should instead apply the principles in Katz, that a search or 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when a person has “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,”82 Karo, that monitoring a tracking device in a private 
residence violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights,83 and the concurrences in 
Jones. 
E. The Development and Use of GPS Technology 
The GPS system used in smartphones comes from twenty-four of the 443 GPS 
satellites in the United States. 84 GPS in cell phones was first used to improve 
emergency response by giving emergency operators the exact location of the person 
in need rather than relying on the reporter’s estimated location.85 Now, however, 
GPS in cell phones is used for more than aiding those in need.86 Individuals use 
smartphone GPS to locate dining and entertainment venues, as well as to obtain 
                                                                                                                                            
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 82 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). 
 83 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984). 
 84 UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issue
s/ucs-satellite-database.html; What is GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/. 
Of the 443 satellites, eight are civil, 116 are government, 122 are military, and 197 are 
commercial. See UCS Satellite Database, supra. The newest satellites have the “capability to 
meet the evolving needs of military, commercial and civilian users worldwide.” U.S. Air 
Force Awards Lockheed Martin Contract for Third and Fourth GPS III Satellites, LOCKHEED 
MARTIN (January 12, 2012), http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2012/ 
january/0112_ss_gps.html. “[These] satellites will deliver better accuracy and improved anti-
jamming power while enhancing the spacecraft’s design life and adding a new civil signal 
designed to be interoperable with international global navigation satellite systems.” Id. 
 85 Ian Herbert, Where We are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology 
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 422, 477 
(2011). 
 86 See, e.g., Sonja Thompson, 10 Smartphone Features that I’m Pretty Darn Thankful For, 
TECH REPUBLIC (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/10-
smartphone-features-that-im-pretty-darn-thankful-for/. 
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driving directions.87 Additionally, law enforcement uses smartphone GPS to track 
individuals for their criminal investigations.88 
Law enforcement may locate and track a person by collecting two prominent 
types of cell phone data: cell-site location and ping data.89 Cell-site location data, 
also known as cell-site location information (CSLI), begins when an individual’s cell 
phone communicates identification and serial numbers to a cell tower.90 This 
information is collected by telecommunications providers and can be viewed by law 
enforcement as “historical” CSLI or “real-time” CSLI.91 To “ping” means to send a 
signal to a particular cell phone and have that phone respond with the requested 
data.92 
GPS-enabled surveillance appeals to law enforcement because GPS allows law 
enforcement “to collect continuous, detailed, and real-time location, speed, direction, 
and duration information.”93 Law enforcement can collect this information for hours, 
days, weeks, months, and even years without the smartphone user’s knowledge—a 
power easily subject to abuse.94 Other advantages to law enforcement include the 
accuracy and flexibility of GPS data. For example, current GPS technology typically 
achieves spatial resolution within about thirty-three feet.95 This means, for example, 
that law enforcement could locate an individual using his cell phone within 
approximately thirty-three feet of the individual’s exact location. GPS also makes it 
easier to collect detailed information “without incurring the commensurate costs in 
dedicated employee resources, salary, benefits, [maintenance,] and overtime pay.”96 
Law enforcement can locate individuals in this manner from any location, making 
GPS-enabled surveillance not only cheaper but vastly superior to visual surveillance 
because “no one human or organization of human observers is currently capable of 
                                                                                                                                            
 87 New Research Shows Consumers Want a Side of Technology with their Meals, NAT’L 
REST. ASS’N (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.restaurant.org/News-Research/News/New-research-
shows-consumers-want-a-side-of-techno. 
 88 See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013). 
 89 See e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location 
Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011). 
 90 See Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause is Necessary to Protect 
What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1882 (2011) (citing 
Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use 
of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004)).  
 91 Id. at 1883. 
 92 See Locating Mobile Phones through Pinging and Triangulation, PURSUIT MAGAZINE 
(July 1, 2008), http://pursuitmag.com/locating-mobile-phones-through-pinging-and-
triangulation/. The term “ping” derived from SONAR when a technician would send a ping 
and wait for its return to locate another object. Id. 
 93 Lenese C. Herbert, Challenging the (Un)constitutionality of Governmental GPS 
Surveillance, 26 CRIM. JUST. 34, 34 (2011). 
 94 Id. 
 95 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 2011). 
 96 Id. 
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such comprehensive, continuous, and accurate information regarding location and 
movement monitoring.”97 
The precision, low cost, and ease of collecting GPS data give law enforcement a 
leg up on fighting crime. This result is welcomed in society. However, the existing 
convenience and simplicity in tracking an individual’s smartphone presents 
opportunity for abuse when collected without a warrant based on probable cause. 
Not only is the collection of GPS data invasive, its intrusion into society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is also not likely to be welcomed by society.98 
III. CURRENT CASE LAW REGARDING SMARTPHONE TRACKING 
Most courts have applied the Fourth Amendment when analyzing law 
enforcement’s use of smartphones as tracking devices, thereby requiring a warrant 
based on probable cause before any such use could occur.99 However, some courts 
have questioned whether there are other ways by which law enforcement can collect 
smartphone GPS data without a warrant.100 Specifically, some courts have discussed 
collection of GPS data under the ECPA.101 This Section focuses on courts that have 
contemplated the application of the ECPA in deciding whether a warrant is required 
to obtain GPS data. This Section also focuses on courts that have applied the Fourth 
Amendment to law enforcement’s use of smartphone GPS in tracking individuals. 
These courts have applied or distinguished Jones, as well as other doctrines, 
resulting in a flurry of differing opinions. 
A. “Big Brother’s” False Hope: Law Enforcement’s Collection of Smartphone GPS 
Data Under the ECPA 
When the government seeks to collect location information under the ECPA, 
they do so under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) or a combination of the 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace statutes, and the SCA. The SCA protects 
communications held in electronic storage, while the Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace statutes pertain to record dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
                                                                                                                                            
 97 L. C. Herbert, supra note 93, at 35; see also Application of the U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 
540. 
 98 Byron Acohido, Can Snowden Revert Privacy to a Social Norm?, USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/10/30/how-snowden-is-returning-
privacy-to-a-social-norm/3318559/. 
 99 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Powell, 943 
F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, *7-9 
(Mass. App. Div. 2012); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 (Mass. App. Div. 
2012); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013). 
 100 See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012); In re Application of the 
United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap 
and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 
F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 101 Application of the U.S., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678; Application of the U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d 
294. 
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information used in the process of transmitting wire or electronic communications 
without a court order.102 Courts have ruled differently when deciding whether these 
statutes sufficiently protect individuals’ privacy rights. Issues arise such as the 
differing evidentiary standards under the ECPA and the Fourth Amendment and 
whether the GPS data is historical or prospective.103 
In United States v. Graham and a recent Fifth Circuit case, the courts held that 
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the government seeks to collect 
historical GPS data.104 Both courts found that the SCA provided sufficient privacy 
protections for historical GPS data.105 According to these courts, then, the “specific 
and articulable” standard required by the SCA protects individuals’ privacy interests 
akin to the probable cause standard required under the Fourth Amendment.106 
Important to note, however, is that the specific and articulable standard is a lesser 
standard than probable cause because all that is required are facts demonstrating 
reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation; probable cause requires a reasonable amount of 
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and 
cautious person’s belief that certain facts are probably true.107 
Although both courts found that the SCA protects privacy interests similar to the 
Fourth Amendment, the courts found that historical GPS data are business records 
and should therefore be analyzed under the third party and business records 
doctrines.108 Specifically, these courts found that historical GPS data are the business 
records of phone companies and are voluntarily provided by the phone’s user.109 
Additionally, neither court decided to apply Jones, based on the fact that Jones dealt 
with a different type of GPS technology.110 Rather, these courts stated that the 
legislature might be better equipped to decide such policy concerns.111 Justice 
Sotomayor alluded to the inapplicability of the business records and third party 
doctrines to current GPS tracking in her concurrence by stating that it is “ill suited to 
the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”112 Therefore, Jones 
should have been followed and the Fourth Amendment implicated.  
The Western District of Louisiana and the Eastern District of New York also 
considered the issue of whether the collection of smartphone GPS data required a 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment or the SCA. The Western District of Louisiana 
                                                                                                                                            
 102 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2712, ch. 206 (West 2012). 
 103 I will use the term “prospective” to also include “real-time” GPS collection. 
 104 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d 600; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 386. 
 105 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 390. 
 106 Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 388. 
 107 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
 108 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 403. 
 109 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 403. 
 110 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 394. 
 111 Application for Historical Data, 724 F.3d at 614; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
 112 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
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granted an order to obtain prospective GPS data pursuant to the Pen Register Statute 
and the SCA, while the Eastern District of New York denied a similar order.113 The 
Louisiana court found that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated because the 
government did not seek GPS information that might be available when the 
defendant’s cell phone was turned off; it only sought information communicated to 
cell phone towers.114 Again, this court made the unnecessary distinction between 
types of GPS data. The New York court, however, found the opposite.115 
The New York court made the appropriate analysis when it determined that the 
SCA does not permit the collection of GPS data without a warrant based on probable 
cause. This court correctly stated that disclosure of GPS information turned a 
smartphone into a tracking device, which requires a showing of probable cause under 
the Fourth Amendment, not the lesser standard set forth in the SCA.116 Accordingly, 
the court held that the SCA does not apply because GPS data neither pertains to an 
individual’s utilization of a provider’s electronic communication service, as the SCA 
requires, nor focuses on communications already in existence, as does the SCA.117 
Therefore, according to this New York court, because the SCA does not apply, 
probable cause is required for the disclosure of smartphone GPS data pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment. 
In line with the New York court, the court in United States v. Powell found that a 
warrant for the collection of GPS data requires probable cause.118 The Powell court 
found that “when the government requests authorization to engage in long-term, 
real-time tracking of an individual’s movements via his or her cell phone . . . Fourth 
Amendment concerns are implicated.”119 Based on statutory interpretation, 
technological differences, and a distinction between historical CSLI and prospective 
GPS collection, this court found that the SCA, wiretaps, Pen-Register statute, and a 
combination of the SCA and Pen-Register statutes are not applicable to prospective 
smartphone tracking.120 The distinction by the court, however, offers no protection to 
individuals because prospective information will inevitably become historical, thus 
this information will then inevitably become available to law enforcement without 
the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause. The distinction also burdens 
law enforcement in that it causes the government to provide a warrant based on a 
separate standard, or wait until the data becomes historical. 
                                                                                                                                            
 113 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. 
and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (W.D. La. 2006); In re Application of the 
U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and 
Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 114 Application of the U.S., 411 F. Supp. 2d at 681-82. 
 115 Application of the U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
 116 Id. at 300. 
 117 Id. at 308. 
 118 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 768 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 119 Id. at 776-77. 
 120 Id.  
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B. Law Enforcement’s Collection of Smartphone GPS Data Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the government’s collection of GPS data, 
rather than the ECPA, does not present any shortage of issues. However, most courts 
apply the Fourth Amendment to smartphone GPS tracking.121 Issues include the type 
of information that could be collected, governmental interest in the search, the length 
of surveillance, and the criminality of the defendant. 
The issue associated with the type of information that could be collected by the 
government through smartphone GPS data is that it presents a privacy intrusion. The 
court in Commonwealth v. Pitt122 analyzed this issue by applying the Katz test.123 The 
court reasoned that “a cell phone subscriber takes no overt steps to communicate his 
physical location to a cell phone service provider” because the user is likely unaware 
that making a call could disclose his location to law enforcement.124 Thus, according 
to the Pitt court, the only information voluntarily and knowingly conveyed by the 
user is the number dialed.125 This, however, is the opposite position of that taken by 
the court in Graham, which held that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when 
the government seeks to collect historical GPS data.126 The Pitt court, therefore, 
afforded more privacy in location information than the court in Graham. 
The Pitt court found that the collection of GPS data allows for “dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices” due to the type of information “that the defendant’s [GPS 
data] could have exposed [such as] intimate knowledge about his personal life.”127 
Examples of “intimate knowledge” suggested by the court were political, religious, 
amicable, and amorous associations.128 The court stated that it would be absurd to 
decide the constitutionality of a search after the fact, based on the information that it 
produced,129 and also found that almost all citizens of Massachusetts carry with them 
a GPS tracking device due to the “ubiquity of modern cell phones and ‘smart phones 
. . . .’”130 This is true not only in Massachusetts, but throughout the entire United 
States.131 The court therefore concluded that a warrant based on probable cause is 
                                                                                                                                            
 121 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 
764; Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, *7-9 (Mass. App. Div. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 (Mass. App. Div. 2012); State v. Earls, 70 
A.3d 630, 638 (N.J. 2013). 
 122 Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445. 
 123 Id. at *3. 
 124 Id. at *3-4. 
 125 Id. at *3. 
 126 United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403 (D. Md. 2012). 
 127 Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, at *8. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at *7. 
 130 Id. 
 131 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013). 
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required for such collection because the Fourth Amendment must advance with 
technology to ensure its continued vitality.132  
While the Pitt court affords more privacy in location information than the court 
in Graham, it also uses generalities and does not necessarily look to the subjective 
privacy interests of smartphone users. A question would then arise if defendants 
knew that their smartphone would create a record of their location. Although the Pitt 
court is correct, it fails to state whether a defendant’s knowledge that smartphone use 
creates a record of their location satisfies the objective test. 
A case similar to that of Pitt is Commonwealth v. Wyatt,133 another Massachusetts 
case in which the court relied on Jones.134 Unlike the Pitt court, the Wyatt court 
focused on defendants’ subjective expectations of privacy rather than simply 
assuming that defendants were unaware that a call could disclose their location to 
law enforcement.135 In Wyatt, the court found a subjective expectation of privacy in 
smartphone GPS data because the court found that defendants were unaware that 
their phone usage created a record of their location.136 The court also found an 
objective expectation of privacy because the use of smartphones has become so 
pervasive, and finding otherwise would compromise “what it means to be a citizen 
of the [United States] free from arbitrary surveillance.”137 
The Wyatt Court was correct in stating that the use of smartphones is pervasive. 
There are an estimated 321,716,905 cell phone subscribers in the United States, with 
nearly half of them being smartphone users.138 This number is surely going to 
continue its trend upwards in the coming years. The Pitt and Wyatt courts recognized 
the dependence of Americans on their smartphones and the proximity of the phone to 
the person, creating the possibility of privacy intrusion not imagined by the Framers 
of the Fourth Amendment.139 Such governmental intrusion requires a warrant based 
on probable cause, not the lesser standard of proof established by the SCA.  
Courts also look at the government’s interest in collecting GPS data separate 
from the type of information collected. In United States v. Ortiz,140 the court held 
                                                                                                                                            
 132 Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, at *9. 
 133 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L.Rptr. 270 (Mass. App. Div. 2012). 
 134 Id. at *2 (The Court looked at the concurrence in both Jones and Connolly.); see also 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 377 (Mass. 2009) (Gants, J., concurring) 
(Justice Gants’ concurrence focused on a reasonable expectation of privacy. He found that 
police could potentially engage in GPS monitoring of any individual and learn what could 
otherwise only be learned though twenty-four hour surveillance.). 
 135 Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270 at *6. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at *7. 
 138 Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
ASSOCIATION (2012), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_MY_2012_Graphics-_final.pdf; 
Smartphones Account for Half of All Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone Purchases in the 
U.S., NIELSEN (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/smartphones-
account-for-half-of-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phone-purchases-in-the-us.html. 
 139 Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, at *7 (Mass. App. Div. 2012); Wyatt, 30 
Mass. L. Rptr. 270, at *7. 
 140 United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. Penn. 2012). 
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that “installation and monitoring of a [GPS] tracking device on a vehicle require[d] a 
warrant,” and that any governmental interest in such a search paled in comparison to 
the privacy interests of citizens.141 Although this case concerned an installation of a 
GPS device and not a GPS-enabled smartphone, the principals in this case are 
nevertheless pertinent to GPS embedded smartphones because smartphones act like 
tracking devises—they, like the GPS tracker attached in this case, can provide 
information twenty-four hours a day without regard to where the person goes, who 
the person is, or whether agents are actively monitoring the phone. 
The Ortiz court balanced the government’s intrusion on the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment interests with the legitimate government interest.142 The court found that 
the infringed privacy interests created by the tracking deserved considerable weight 
due to the length of time defendant was monitored.143 Thus, the court reasoned that 
the length of time a defendant was tracked and whether there is a period of time 
where it is reasonable to track and not to track is a major issue of concern in 
weighing government interest against individuals’ privacy rights.144 In Ortiz, the 
court found no legitimate government interest because the government did not prove 
a need to use the GPS tracker beyond the normal need for law enforcement.145 In the 
case of smartphones, information is provided for longer periods without burdening 
law enforcement with attaching another GPS device, so the Ortiz ruling would seem 
to apply even more strongly to that type of search.  
Another case looking into government interests, and one of the biggest 
smartphone GPS tracking cases, is United States v. Skinner.146 The Sixth Circuit held 
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the government’s collection of 
smartphone GPS data because the defendant “did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the data emanating from his cell phone that showed its location.”147 
This reasoning contrasts with Pitt and Wyatt. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
individuals may not rely on the expected “untrackability” of their tools because if 
such were the case, then smartphone technology would help criminals, not law 
enforcement.148 In addition, the court stated that “[l]aw enforcement tactics must be 
allowed to advance with technological changes, in order to prevent criminals from 
circumventing the justice system.”149 This view is in direct contrast to the Pitt court’s 
view that the Fourth Amendment must advance with technological changes. 
The Skinner court also cited Knotts, finding that the defendant was traveling on 
public roads, and the GPS data that aided law enforcement could also have been 
obtained through visual surveillance.150 The Supreme Court, however, in United 
                                                                                                                                            
 141 Id. at 530-32. 
 142 Id. at 530. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at 531. 
 145 Id. at 530. 
 146 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 777. 
 149 Id. at 778. 
 150 Id.  
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States v. Jones, expressly rejected this reasoning when it upheld the circuit court’s 
ruling rather than the ruling of the district court.151 The Skinner court distinguished 
Jones, holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the GPS data and location of his cell phone because authorities tracked a known 
number that was voluntarily used while traveling on public thoroughfares.152 The 
Skinner court also took into account the fact that the phone was used during the 
commission of a crime.153 The criminality of the defendant, however, should not be a 
factor in determining whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by a 
government’s search because the Fourth Amendment protects all citizens, criminals 
or not. 
The Sixth Circuit determined Jones was not controlling because it decided there 
was no physical intrusion onto defendant or his property that may have constituted a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.154 In addition, the court looked at Justice 
Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s concurring opinions in Jones, finding that the 
majority’s opinion provided little guidance on cases of electronic surveillance 
without physical intrusion and that there was little precedent in this area.155 The court 
further distinguished Jones by looking at the amount of time involved in the GPS 
monitoring, again raising the issue of length of monitoring.156 
Justice Donald, in his concurring opinion, found that society is not prepared to 
recognize defendant’s expectation of privacy as legitimate because the majority’s 
reasoning was contrary to established law.157 Donald stated that privacy expectations 
are not diminished by the criminality of a defendant’s activities,158 and that holding 
                                                                                                                                            
 151 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (holding that the attachment of the 
GPS devise constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment).  
 152 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 779.  
 153 Id. at 785. 
 154 Id. at 780. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. In Jones, Justice Alito raised concerns that using legal methods, law enforcement 
may comprehensively track a person's activities, which are unreasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963. His example was monitoring the location 
of a vehicle for four weeks. Id. He stated that doing so would require a large team of agents, 
multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Id. However, with current technology, Justice 
Alito recognized that law enforcement can “secretly monitor and catalogue every single 
movement” that a defendant made over four weeks, which would have previously been 
impossible. See id. at 964. 
The court in Skinner found that Justice Alito’s concerns, although valid, were not present in 
the case because DEA agents only tracked Skinner's cell phone for three days, rather than 
twenty-eight days as in Jones. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780. The court further distinguished this 
concern, stating that the monitoring was no more of a comprehensively invasive search than if 
the car was identified, tracked visually, and the search handed off from one local authority to 
another as the vehicles progressed. Id. 
 157 Id. at 785-86. 
 158 Id. at 785. 
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otherwise is contrary to law.159 Donald also stated that Knotts is distinguishable 
because law enforcement had already identified and undertaken visual surveillance 
of a particular suspect, whereas in the present case, the agents did not know the 
identity of their suspect, the car he drove, or the route he was traveling.160 He 
consequently found that society is prepared to recognize a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in GPS data emitted from a smartphone when law enforcement does not use 
the GPS data to simply augment their search.161 He argued that this reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists because the government could not have discovered the 
aforementioned information without the GPS data.162 
Skinner paved the way for other courts to find that collecting smartphone GPS 
data does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.163 Two examples are United States v. 
Barrera-Barron and People v. Moorer.164 In Barrera-Barron, the court relied on 
Skinner in finding that the defendant did not have standing, or an expectation of 
privacy, to contest the use of GPS data from the phone he used.165 The Barrera-
Barron court rejected any expectation of privacy argument by focusing on Knotts 
and Skinner, stating that “[t]here is no inherent constitutional difference between 
trailing a defendant and tracking him via [GPS] technology. Law enforcement tactics 
must be allowed to advance with technological changes, in order to prevent criminals 
from circumventing the justice system.”166 The Barrera-Barron court also stated that 
the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy because he was traveling on 
public thoroughfares.167 
In People v. Moorer, the court correctly rejected any statutory authority allowing 
law enforcement to ping the defendant’s cell phone;168 however, it also found that 
individuals have no expectation of privacy in their smartphone GPS data under the 
Fourth Amendment or the New York State Constitution, incorrectly relying on 
Skinner and Knotts—allowing the government to track the defendant’s smartphone 
                                                                                                                                            
 159 Id. Justice Donald looked to United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980), and 
found that under the Fourth Amendment there is a distinction between contraband and other 
property. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 785. Any item that is legitimately owned is not considered 
contraband. Id. Donald found that the defendant’s possession of the phone was legitimate and 
not unlawful or suspicious in itself, therefore finding the majority’s holding, that defendant 
had no expectation of privacy in his phone because he used it to conduct criminal activities, 
was contrary to law. Id. 
 160 Id. at 786. 
 161 See id. at 786. 
 162 See id. 
 163 United States v. Barrera-Barron, No. 12-20066-22-KHV, 2013 WL 3989182, at *6 (D. 
Kan. Aug. 1, 2013); United States v. Money, No. 6:12–53–DCR, 2013 WL 412626 (E.D. Ky. 
Feb. 1, 2013); People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 876 (Monroe Cnty. 2013). 
 164 Barrera-Barron, 2013 WL 3989182; Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868. 
 165 Barrera-Barron, 2013 WL 3989182, at *6. 
 166 Id. at *6. Like the Skinner court, there was no concern with the Fourth Amendment 
protections advancing along with technological changes. 
 167 Id.  
 168 Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 876.  
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with no warrant under the Fourth Amendment.169 The court followed Knotts, but 
rejected other Fourth Amendment case law on the basis that it involved installed 
GPS technology, rather than “voluntary utilization” of “tracking technology.”170 The 
court’s distinction is hypocritical because Knotts, like the case law it rejected, 
involved installed GPS technology, not a “voluntary utilization” of “tracking 
technology.”171 
The Moorer court further stated,  
public ignorance about cell phone technology can no longer be 
maintained in this day and age—cell phones are voluntarily carried by 
their users and may be turned on or off at will. People are not so oblivious 
that they are not aware that cell phones purchased today come with GPS 
technology which can pinpoint the location of the phone at any given time 
so long as it is turned on and the GPS technology has not been deactivated 
or disabled. . . . By a person’s voluntary utilization, through GPS 
technology, of a cell phone, a person necessarily has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the phone’s location—vis-à-vis the 
pinging—even though he maintains what may be a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the content of his phone conversations.172  
The Moorer court does not consider the obvious fact that knowledge about 
governmental privacy intrusions does not mean that the person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. If anything, the opposite is true—knowledge creates not only 
awareness of possible constitutional violations, but also a desire for privacy.173 
In a separate case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held that individuals 
“have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cellphone [GPS data], and that 
police must obtain a search warrant before accessing that information . . . .”174 
Although the court based its decision on the New Jersey State Constitution,175 the 
reasoning supports the many arguments in favor of requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause prior to government collection of GPS data from one’s smartphone. 
Like the concurrences in Jones, the court recognized the intrusiveness of using a 
smartphone to locate the phone’s owner:176 “Using a cell phone to determine the 
location of its owner . . . is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a 
substitute for 24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their 
resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not 
anticipate.”177 In addition, the court followed Pitt and Wyatt, stating that collection of 
GPS data from a smartphone “can reveal not just where people go . . . but also the 
                                                                                                                                            
 169 Id. at 879-81. 
 170 Id. at 881. 
 171 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 172 Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 881. 
 173 Acohido, supra note 98. 
 174 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 633 (N.J. 2013). 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 642. 
 177 Id. 
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people and groups they choose to affiliate with and when they actually do so[, 
which] cuts across a broad range of personal ties . . . .”178 
The New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized the problem with applying 
Knotts to cases where law enforcement uses a smartphone to locate an individual 
using the phone’s GPS data,179 stating, “[m]odern cell phones also blur the historical 
distinction between public and private areas because cell phones emit signals from 
both places. . . . [L]aw enforcement [has] no way of knowing in advance whether [a] 
defendant’s cell phone was being monitored in a public or private space.”180 This 
reasoning shows the difficulty in relying on Knotts in the modern age of technology. 
Following the courts in Pitt and Wyatt, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recognized that smartphones have “become an indispensable part of modern life,” in 
direct contrast to the court in Moorer.181 Unlike the Moorer court, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court recognized that “[p]eople buy cell phones to communicate with 
others, to use the Internet, and for a growing number of other reasons. But no one 
buys a cell phone to share detailed information about their whereabouts with the 
police.”182 The court also rejected any notion that society’s knowledge about GPS 
data collection negates a reasonable expectation of privacy.183 However, like the Pitt 
court, the New Jersey Supreme Court made a general assumption that “most people 
do not realize the extent of modern tracking capabilities and reasonably do not 
expect law enforcement to convert their phones into precise, possibly continuous 
tracking tools.”184 Like Pitt, the New Jersey Supreme Court fails to address whether 
a smartphone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy if he is aware that his 
smartphone GPS data can be tracked.185 
Fourth Amendment case law clearly shows different approaches to the issue of 
smartphone GPS monitoring. First, courts will either follow Jones and Justices 
Sotomayor’s and Alito’s concurrences and hold that collection of GPS data requires 
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, or distinguish Jones and follow Knotts, 
holding that no warrant is required to collect GPS data. Factual issues of concern to 
these courts are the type of information that could be collected, the government’s 
burden, the criminality of the defendant, and the length of time the defendant was 
tracked. These are important factors for courts to consider when deciding whether a 
                                                                                                                                            
 178 Id. 
 179 See id.  
 180 Id. 
 181 See id.  
 182 Id. at 643. 
 183 Id. at 643-44. 
 184 Id. 
 185 With the recent unveiling that the National Security Agency (“NSA”) is collecting 
certain electronic records, the American public is more aware than ever that the government 
has the ability to, and does, collect certain “private” information. The recent uproar and debate 
about the constitutionality of this collection is proof that although the public has knowledge of 
such practices, the public still has a privacy interest in the information collected. This is also 
true of GPS data collected from smartphones. Although Americans now understand that the 
government can collect the GPS data, there is still a privacy interest in the data. 
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Fourth Amendment warrant based on probable cause is required when tracking an 
individual through the collection of smartphone GPS data. 
IV. REQUIRING A WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR SMARTPHONE 
GPS 
This Section argues that a warrant based on probable cause is required prior to 
law enforcement’s collection of smartphone GPS data to track individuals. This 
Section then explains why the ECPA, with its lesser standard of proof, should not be 
used as a substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause for 
the collection of smartphone GPS data. This Section also shows which Fourth 
Amendment legal standards should apply to smartphone GPS monitoring by looking 
at case law and public policy. Additionally, this Section addresses arguments against 
a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, similar to the arguments made in Skinner, 
Barrera-Baron, and Moorer. Lastly, this Section proposes solutions to the growing 
problem of warrantless smartphone GPS data collection and uncertain case law. 
A. The ECPA and Smartphone GPS Data: Applying the Past to the Present 
The ECPA is inapplicable to the collection of smartphone GPS data for three 
reasons. First, the collection of GPS data emanating from a smartphone does not, as 
the ECPA requires, “pertain to the subscriber’s use of the provider’s electronic 
communication service.”186 An electronic communication service is any service that 
provides to its users the ability to send or receive electronic or wire 
communication.187 Some would argue that smartphones are electronic 
communication services and that collection of GPS data from this source would 
therefore fall under “electronic communications.”188 However, because GPS-
embedded phones act as tracking devices when used by law enforcement to monitor 
individuals’ whereabouts, and because tracking devices do not fall under the 
definition of “electronic communication,”189 collection of this data does not in fact 
fall under the scope of the ECPA. That smartphone GPS data is not a wire 
                                                                                                                                            
 186 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 187 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (West 2014).  
 188 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use 
of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. 
and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (W.D. La. 2006) (finding that the Pen 
Register Statute and the SCA allowed collection of GPS data). 
 189 See id.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12)(C) (West 2014).  
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communication190 is also evident by the fact that there is no transfer of a human 
voice—only GPS data is involved.191 
Second, case law that applied the ECPA to smartphone GPS data made 
distinctions between historical and prospective GPS data.192 This distinction, 
however, is irrelevant because over time prospective GPS data will become 
historical GPS data, and the distinction is made only because of the ECPA’s 
language rather than privacy concerns.193 Statutes that focus on electronic 
surveillance—Wiretap and Pen Register and Trap statutes—pertain to prospective 
collection of GPS information, which differs from that of the SCA, which pertains to 
historical GPS data.194 These statutes do not take into account the privacy invasions 
that may occur through collecting smartphone GPS data. It is highly unlikely that 
Congress contemplated legislating about smartphones when enacting the ECPA 
because smartphones did not exist; therefore, it is likewise unlikely that that ECPA 
should apply to smartphone GPS data.  
Third, the ECPA’s standard of proof is not sufficient for protecting smartphone 
users’ constitutional rights. The specific and articulable standard under the SCA, a 
lesser standard than the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause, does not provide 
enough protection to a smartphone user’s privacy interest in their GPS data. A 
standard less exacting than probable cause does not sufficiently protect smartphone 
users from unreasonable collections of GPS data because it allows the government to 
collect data so long as the facts demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the 
information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation; 
under probable cause, the government would have to prove a reasonable amount of 
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and 
cautious person’s belief that certain facts are probably true. Additionally, the most 
current cases regarding government collection of GPS data have applied the Fourth 
                                                                                                                                            
 190 See Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758. “Wire communication” is 
defined as any transfer containing the human voice made through the use of facilities for the 
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between 
the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged in 
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign 
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2510(1), (18) (West 2014). 
 191 GPS data is transmitted over a different control channel than the voice channel. In re 
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register 
and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site 
Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 
949 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 192 Application of the U.S., 411 F. Supp. 2d at 682. 
 193 “A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in 
electronic storage . . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (West 2014). The term “electronic storage” 
means that the electronic communication must have been stored, implying that the information 
is not prospective, but already exists. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (West 2014). 
 194 Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58. 
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Amendment’s probable cause standard because those courts recognize that the 
ECPA does not apply to government collection of GPS data.195 
The Fourth Amendment avoids these three issues by requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the ECPA should not be 
applied to the government’s collection of GPS data from a smartphone user’s phone. 
B. Fourth Amendment Case Law and Public Policy: Following the Signals 
Knotts, Karo, Katz, and Jones laid the foundation for current GPS tracking cases. 
All of these cases recognize that a search occurs: (1) when a person expects privacy 
in the thing searched or seized, and society believes that expectation is reasonable; or 
(2) when law enforcement trespasses on a searched or seized person’s property.196 In 
the case of nearly all smartphone users, law enforcement does not place a GPS 
device on the suspect’s phone. Rather, the phone contains a factory-embedded GPS 
device.197 Because there is no trespass by law enforcement, therefore, the Jones 
majority and Ortiz, whose holdings were based on a trespass by law enforcement, 
have limited applicability. 
1. Why Knotts is Not Applicable to Smartphone GPS Monitoring 
Applying Knotts, which allowed law enforcement to track individuals without a 
warrant while they are traveling on public roads, to cases where GPS data is 
collected by law enforcement should cease because such allowance results in major 
invasions of privacy. Furthermore, Knotts should not apply to such cases because the 
facts in Knotts are clearly distinguishable. 
The distinction between smartphone GPS and the GPS used in Knotts is that 
there is no governmental trespass in the former—the GPS in a smartphone is factory-
installed without the defendant in mind, whereas the GPS in Knotts was placed on 
the car by the government specifically for the purpose of tracking the defendant.198 If 
Knotts were applied to GPS data collection from smartphones, the government 
would not have to track an individual through the use of a tracking device planted on 
the individual or his belongings. Rather, law enforcement could track smartphone 
users whenever they are on public thoroughfares, meaning that whenever individuals 
are carrying their smartphone on their person in public, the government may legally 
follow their every move without a warrant.  
Allowing this to happen is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. In 
addition, smartphones blur the distinction between public and private places because 
smartphones emit signals from both places.199 Law enforcement therefore does not 
                                                                                                                                            
 195 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying the Katz Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness test); United States v. Money, No. 6:12-53-DCR, 2013 WL 
412626 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2013) (applying the Fourth Amendment). 
 196 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-52 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  
 197 I. Herbert, supra note 85, at 477 (citing Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded 
by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH 1 
(2005)); see also L. C. Herbert, supra note 93, at 34 (stating that most smart phones are 
“preloaded with GPS-enabled technology”). 
 198 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983). 
 199 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013). 
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have a way of knowing in advance whether they are monitoring a person in a public 
or private place, which would violate the ruling in Karo that prevents the 
government from monitoring a tracking device in a private residence. Even if a 
person was in public, however, as Justice Sotomayor and the majority in Jones 
concluded, a person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their public 
movements.200 Justices Sotomayor and Alito concluded that continuous monitoring 
of individuals’ public movements violates their reasonable expectation of privacy.201 
After the Jones decision, therefore, the rule expressed in Knotts was substantially 
weakened. If a person can be tracked while in public without requiring a warrant, 
only the hermit would have an advantage. Knotts has run its course and is no longer 
applicable to cases where law enforcement collects individuals’ smartphone GPS 
data because tracking individuals without a warrant based on probable cause on 
public thoroughfares results in a breach of privacy in individuals’ public movements. 
2. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Smartphone GPS Data 
Katz provides the two-step inquiry of whether there are subjective and objective 
expectations of privacy.202 The first inquiry, the subjective question, is fact based and 
can be determined by looking at whether the individual who claimed a violation of 
his Fourth Amendment rights actually believed he had privacy rights in the GPS data 
emanating from his smartphone.203 
Many individuals are unaware that making a call or sending a text message on 
their smartphone will create a record of their whereabouts, which clearly weighs in 
favor of finding a subjective expectation of privacy. However, more smartphone 
users are becoming aware that such activity does create a location record. Although 
this fact is known, individuals with such knowledge may still have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their smartphone GPS data, even when such a belief is 
erroneous.204 Privacy is slowly diminishing due to the invasiveness of technology. 
However, not recognizing an expectation of privacy when one knows that their 
privacy can be infringed upon will eventually result in no privacy expectations as 
technology becomes more invasive. Therefore, knowledge that smartphones create a 
location record should not mean that individuals do not have a subjective expectation 
of privacy in their smartphone’s GPS data. 
The second inquiry, the objective question, is much more difficult to address. 
Whether there is an objective view of expectation of privacy, or whether society 
believes that an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, will change over 
                                                                                                                                            
 200 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).  
 201 See id. at 957, 963-64. 
 202 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 203 For instance, it must first be determined whether Mr. Russell believed that he had 
privacy interests in the GPS data radiating from his phone. It would be reasonable to assume 
from the facts that he in fact did believe that law enforcement could not track his movements 
using the GPS in his smartphone. Testimony of a subjective belief would render the first 
prong satisfied, as will almost always be the case. 
 204 As was explained by Justice Donald in Skinner, an erroneous belief that an individual 
has an expectation of privacy in their smartphone’s GPS data does not end the inquiry. United 
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 784 (6th Cir. 2012). It is up to society to determine whether 
the person’s “erroneous” belief was reasonable. Id. 
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time. Currently, smartphone GPS data can provide information twenty-four hours a 
day for months at a time, encouraging “dragnet-type law enforcement practices.”205 
Furthermore, the vast majority of individuals with smartphones carry their phones on 
their person, in essence, creating a tracking device that they carry with them daily. 206 
This allows law enforcement to collect GPS data without concern about who is 
carrying the phone, where the phone is located, or whether government agents are 
actively monitoring the phone.207 It grants the government the opportunity to trace 
our every movement. 
Additionally, social media websites and the extended use of GPS-embedded 
devices in our everyday lives should not degrade the privacy expectations that 
society values. Compilation of “public” information from multiple or continual 
tracking gives law enforcement information that a normal person could not otherwise 
obtain.208 This was seen in Jones, where Justice Alito stated that continuous 
monitoring violates an objective expectation of privacy and thus constitutes a 
search.209 When a stranger sees a person running, for example, the stranger may infer 
that the individual is conscious of their health, but little more. When law 
enforcement has this same information, in addition to information previously and 
prospectively collected, the government can make inferences that the stranger 
cannot. This is a clear invasion of privacy. 
It is apparent that when government collects smartphone GPS data, the 
smartphone user has a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the GPS 
data. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and a warrant based on 
probable cause is required. 
3. Public Policy for Privacy 
Apart from case law, public policy also supports the fact that a warrantless 
collection of smartphone GPS data violates the Fourth Amendment. For instance, a 
person may be in their home when the GPS information is collected. The only way 
to ensure that an individual is not in a private residence is to take note of this through 
visual surveillance. Without visual surveillance, the government could collect data 
unconstitutionally, pursuant to the court’s ruling in Karo.210 Law enforcement likely 
will not know the identity of their suspect, the type of transportation in which the 
suspect is traveling, or where the suspect is located without surveillance. A 
warrantless collection of GPS data violates the purpose behind the Fourth 
Amendment, which is to restrict the government’s use of general warrants, and 
                                                                                                                                            
 205 See L. C. Herbert, supra note 93; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954; Commonwealth v. 
Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, *5 (Mass. App. Div. 2012). 
 206 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 541 (D. Md. 2011). 
 207 United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 536-37 (E.D. Penn. 2012). 
 208 See Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 270, *3 (Mass. App. Div. 2012). 
 209 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64. 
 210 If no visual surveillance is done, how will law enforcement know when to stop 
collecting GPS data from the suspect’s smartphone? How will law enforcement know whether 
Mr. Russell is in a private residence, therefore violating the principle set forth in Karo? United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984). 
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permits government intrusion without identifying the person targeted or where the 
warrant will be executed.211 The problem with collecting smartphone GPS data while 
in a private residence is easily circumvented by requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause, which could in part be established through visual surveillance. 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, GPS data reveals private information 
such as individuals’ religion, sexual orientation, habits, and personal values.212 
Allowing law enforcement to discover this information through GPS data is similar 
to having a person that you do not know follow you for possibly weeks on end, or 
permitting the government to place a GPS tracking device on your person. It is 
extremely unlikely that anyone would condone and welcome such behavior. 
Therefore, there likely exists an objective expectation of privacy, which raises 
concerns about what information the government collects and why it is collected. 
Another policy concern is abuse of power by the government. This was discussed 
in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones:213  
[T]he Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal 
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that 
GPS monitoring [gives law enforcement] a relatively low cost and 
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track, and may “alter 
the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical 
to democratic society.”214  
She further stated that this unwelcomed power would defeat the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, which is to “curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and 
prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”215 
The government described by Justice Sotomayor sounds eerily similar to the one 
in George Orwell’s novel, 1984.216 In 1984, Orwell wrote,  
[t]he telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. . . . There was of 
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given 
moment. How often, or on what system, the [police] plugged in on any 
individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched 
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire 
whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did live, from habit that 
became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.217  
                                                                                                                                            
 211 The U.S. Supreme Court recently supported an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 212 See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, *8 (Mass. App. Div. 2012). 
 213 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56. 
 214 Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring)). 
 215 Id. (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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Although Orwell’s recital may seem extreme or farfetched, it no longer is 
considering the fact that law enforcement can monitor smartphone users’ every move 
at any given moment.218 
Orwell’s telescreen is the modern-day smartphone. Allowing the government to 
collect smartphone GPS data by any means other than with a finding of probable 
cause contradicts the concerns of the drafters of the Fourth Amendment. It was for 
this reason that the probable cause standard was adopted for warrants.219 Without 
requiring a warrant based on probable cause, law enforcement can track a 
smartphone user for days at a time without them knowing and for any reason the 
government desires. The longer the individual is monitored, the more information 
will be collected. In addition, the more information that is collected, the greater the 
likelihood that the information collected will reveal non-relevant, or “intimate,” 
information or come from a private residence.220 The fact that GPS data can expose 
“intimate knowledge” about a user’s personal life is enough to intrude on an 
objective expectation of privacy, requiring a warrant based on probable cause.221 
A separate policy concern is whether the requirement of a warrant based on 
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, in comparison to one based on a lesser 
standard under the ECPA or not requiring a warrant at all, unduly burdens law 
enforcement. Requiring the government to obtain a warrant based on probable cause 
does not create an unreasonable burden for law enforcement because law 
enforcement can deviate from this requirement if exigent circumstances exist.222 
Because this exception to the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause 
exists, this requirement does not unduly burden the government, but protects 
smartphone users from unreasonable searches. 
C. Rejecting Arguments that a Warrant under the Fourth Amendment is Not 
Required to Collect GPS Data 
Many counter-arguments have been made as to why smartphone users should not 
have any expectation of privacy in the GPS data collected from their phone. Many of 
these arguments were made in Skinner and cases that followed. Due to the fallacy of 
these arguments, a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment is required. 
One argument, made by the courts in Skinner and Barrera-Barron, is that 
requiring a warrant based on probable cause unreasonably burdens the government 
to the advantage of criminals.223 In other words, law enforcement surveillance 
techniques must advance with technological advancements.224 There is no doubt that 
law enforcement tactics must advance with technological changes. However, this 
advancement must not come at the expense of personal liberties. If law enforcement 
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tactics advance, so too must the protections guaranteed under the Fourth 
Amendment. Otherwise, the government could circumvent the Constitution, eliciting 
“Orwellian consequences.”225 Doing otherwise is contrary to American liberty and 
freedom.226 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Jones, “because GPS 
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by 
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive 
law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”227 
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment already accounts for any burden that the 
warrant requirement may pose to law enforcement by allowing for circumstances 
where a warrant is not required.228 Requiring a warrant based on probable cause, 
therefore, does not impede law enforcement’s task of arresting criminals. In addition, 
it is not unreasonable to require the government to obtain a warrant based on 
probable cause because warrants are required for other types of searches and 
seizures.229 
Another argument, made in Skinner, Moorer, and Graham, is that smartphone 
location information is voluntarily disclosed to a third party and therefore there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data.230 Under the business records and 
third party doctrine, a person has no expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily shared with third parties.231 Justice Sotomayor noted, however, this 
doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”232 
Along the same lines, the Moorer court argued that people have no expectation 
of privacy in smartphone GPS data because more people are aware that smartphone 
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GPS technology can pinpoint their location.233 The court also found no expectation 
of privacy because GPS technology can be turned off.234 The Moorer court stated:  
public ignorance about cell phone technology can no longer be 
maintained in this day and age—cell phones are voluntarily carried by 
their users and may be turned on or off at will. People are not so oblivious 
that they are not aware that cell phones purchased today come with GPS 
technology which can pinpoint the location of the phone at any given time 
so long as it is turned on and the GPS technology has not been deactivated 
or disabled. . . . By a person’s voluntary utilization, through GPS 
technology, of a cell phone, a person necessarily has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the phone’s location—vis-à-vis the 
pinging—even though he maintains what may be a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the content of his phone conversations.235 
The Moorer court, however, ignores the fact that just because a person has 
knowledge about GPS data collection, it does not mean that the person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.236 People buy smartphones to communicate, use 
the Internet, for its GPS capability, and for a growing number of other reasons.237 No 
one buys a smartphone to share detailed information about his or her whereabouts 
with the government.238 Additionally, disabling the GPS renders the smartphone 
useless to many of its users. 
A second reason that the Moorer court’s argument is flawed is that it states that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s phone conversation, but not the 
GPS data.239 This seriously contradicts the court’s reasoning against finding an 
expectation of privacy in smartphone GPS data because most people are aware that 
their phone conversation may be listened to and people have the choice to not speak 
on the phone. The court appeared to ignore the subjective prong of the Katz test. A 
user’s subjective expectation of privacy is just that: subjective.240 Because a user’s 
subjective expectation is based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or 
opinions, it is easy for another to determine that these feelings, tastes, or opinions 
were irrational. However, just because an individual’s expectation is irrational does 
not mean that that individual did not subjectively have that expectation.  
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Another argument, made by the Skinner and Powell Courts, is that short-term 
smartphone GPS tracking does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.241 This 
argument is flawed for two reasons. First, it is difficult to determine short-term 
tracking. Is it a couple of days? A week? Drawing a bright line rule to determine 
short-term monitoring would be arbitrary and conflate the already varied case law on 
the subject.242 
Second, short-term smartphone GPS monitoring still presents Fourth 
Amendment concerns. A person’s Fourth Amendment rights can be violated within 
minutes of tracking via collection of GPS data if such collection is done without a 
warrant based on probable cause. Time is not discriminatory. Allowing warrantless 
collection of the GPS data for short periods of time does not sufficiently protect 
individuals from having their Fourth Amendment rights violated. It is for the above 
reasons that the arguments made in Skinner and the courts that followed are flawed. 
D. Solutions to the Issue of Warrantless Collection of Smartphone GPS Data 
There are three proposed solutions to ensure that individuals’ Fourth Amendment 
rights are not violated by the warrantless tracking of their smartphone GPS data. The 
first option is to allow the states to rule on the issue independently. States could 
choose to do so through the courts or legislature. State court rulings would not 
necessarily solve the issue, however, as a few state courts have found no expectation 
of privacy in smartphone GPS data.243 Therefore, the state legislatures may be a 
better solution than the courts. In 2013, Montana and Maine passed laws requiring 
police to obtain a warrant demonstrating probable cause to access cellphone data.244 
Laws, however, may vary between states, creating possible issues when law 
enforcement is tracking a person through multiple states. 
A more practical option may be for the United States Supreme Court to take up 
the issue that it avoided in Jones, despite being briefly touched upon by both Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito in their concurring opinions. This would resolve the various 
court rulings throughout the country. A possible issue could arise, however, if there 
is a plurality opinion, causing even more confusion in an already muddled area of 
law. 
The third and most viable option is for Congress to pass legislation dealing with 
the collection of smartphone GPS data. Justice Alito stated in Jones that, “[i]n 
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy 
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concerns may be legislative.”245 For one, Congress is better situated than the courts 
to gauge public attitudes.246 Additionally, Congress can draw detailed lines and 
balance privacy and public safety better than the courts.247 
Failing to resolve the differing case law would result in violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. Furthermore, Skinner will become the foundation for bad law in a 
growing area of jurisprudence. Skinner has already influenced numerous courts to 
find that an individual has no expectation of privacy in their smartphone GPS data.248 
It is through any of these three solutions that the proper protections will be afforded 
to smartphone users. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Technological advancements are continuing to modify and influence criminal 
law. Smartphones provide individuals greater access to the world, but permit the 
government greater access into their private lives. It is important that the law 
surrounding smartphone surveillance advance with technology to protect people in 
society, like Mr. Russell. In Mr. Russell’s situation, a warrant based on probable 
cause should have been obtained prior to the collection of his smartphone GPS data. 
Allowing otherwise reduces Fourth Amendment protections and raises privacy 
concerns. 
This Note argued that a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment is required 
before the government can monitor an individual by collecting the GPS data in the 
individual’s smartphone. Part II presented a legal background of information, 
focusing on the Fourth Amendment, the ECPA, and early case law dealing with the 
government’s electronic surveillance. Part III presented recent case law on law 
enforcement’s collection of smartphone GPS data. Part IV explained why a warrant 
based on probable cause is required to monitor smartphone GPS data, focusing on 
legal and public policy arguments. Part IV also illustrated various solutions to 
resolve the problem of courts not requiring a warrant based on probable cause prior 
to the government’s collection of GPS data. 
To avoid “Orwellian consequences” and uphold individuals’ privacy rights, it is 
necessary that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment be required prior to the 
government’s collection of GPS data emanating from any smartphone. Jones laid the 
foundation by refusing to apply Knotts, weakening Knotts’ holding, as well as the 
arguments of the courts that relied on it. The Fourth Amendment, case law, and 
public policy require a warrant based on probable cause, ensuring constitutional 
protection for all people of the United States. For these reasons, a warrant based on 
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained before law 
enforcement can track an individual using the GPS embedded in that person’s 
smartphone. 
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